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RESTRICTEDWAR OR PEACE?

It is the very heart of the problem. Atomic energy control is only conceivable by the international plan. An international agency must be responsible for raw material sources and must produce itself fissionable materials, plutonium, and uranium 235.

It is, fundamentally, the Baruch plan. And let us not forget that this project was submitted to the United Nations at a time when America was the only owner of the secret and of industrial atomic installations.

Since 1946, the Atomic Commission of the United Nations has held innumerable meetings to discuss this project to a point at which they finally gave up their efforts through weariness and because of the apparent impossibility of completing them.

This failure, the most serious that international diplomacy has ever recorded, can be explained in few words. America wishes internationalization of the property and the function of atomic industries and international inspection as a further means of control. Russia proposes a ban on atomic weapons and the inadequate inspection. America preaches internationalism while Russia defends the thesis of national sovereignty.

An international agreement on atomic materials has only one purpose: security. Now, what security can the world have if, behind her impenetrable frontiers, Russia can produce atomic and hydrogen bombs? An ineffective inspection would be the worst solution, for it would create a false sense of security hiding terrible dangers from the world.

The American plan to enter nationalized atomic industries and to give international agency the exclusive right to produce the nuclear combustible in any country contains the security possibilities. But its operation requires the elimination of all the Iron Curtains, the opening of all

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countries, the right to travel and to visit, and, in a word, a return to the condition of life which the world has not known since the first world war.

Would or could Soviet Russia accept this open life without danger to her regime? That is the great question to which, unfortunately, one could only give a negative reply.

In the 33 years of its existence Bolshevism has concealed itself more and more every day. Soviet Russia does not want her subjects to know how the citizens of free countries live, any more than she wants the outside world to know of the existence led by the masses in the "Fatherland of Socialism." The compartment which separates Soviet Russia from the rest of the world becomes more and more water tight every day. Soviet propaganda has only one purpose, to convince the Russians that in the "capitalist" countries, the life of the masses is one of misery and famine, while in Russia alone happiness and joy reign: zhit stalo veselaye - "one lives more happily" - as the Soviet slogan, tirelessly repeated states. Now, under these circumstances could the regime open its doors to hundreds and even to thousands of strangers whose admission would be necessary to effect a control system involving international ownership of the nuclear industries and a real atomic inspection? Here one runs into an absolute impossibility. The Bolshevik regime requires secrecy and isolation. To open the frontiers or even to open them partially, would be a serious blow to this government. The men who have seized absolute power in Russia would not consent to it. Any hope in this regard is therefore out of the question.

Under these circumstances what can come of negotiations with Soviet Russia? The solution of specific problems, of the German problem, of the problem of central Eastern Europe, of the Asiatic problem? It is extremely doubtful. But even if this miracle were to be realized, the major question

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would still remain, the general problem, the atomic problem; that is to say, in the last analysis, the problem of security. And until this has been solved the armaments race will continue, and on the ~~xxxxx~~ day after, as on the eve of this miraculous conference, the same question will be still be asked: war or peace?

No matter how ingenious the diplomats are they cannot change the essential facts of the international problem. It is urgent to solve the specific questions, ~~xx~~ but it is vital to solve the general question, the problem of security. And the latter cannot be solved except in a world with a minimum of liberty. If Russia does not wish to push the world, and consequently, herself she must partly open her doors, she must return to the international community, from which she has deliberately excluded herself because of her regime. One could say with Lincoln that the world could no longer half slave, half free. Humanity cannot rise above its danger and agony unless liberty triumphs. Under the present circumstances, Soviet Russia remaining what she is, the international problem is insoluble.

WAR?

And then? If the agreement, a real and effective agreement, a security agreement is impossible, what remains? War?

That is apparently the logical conclusion. As soon as two great world powers find themselves unable to agree, war is inevitable. That is logical, but we do not believe that it is true, in the near future, of course. The distant future cannot be foreseen, especially in an age which lives under the sign of science, in a period in which, unfortunately, inventions are being multiplied each of which can completely upset the

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military situation.

What we call peace today is plainly a very strange state of affairs. There is fighting here and there, but it is peripheral.

For a general war to break out, either America would have to be converted to the idea of preventive war, or Russia, herself, would have to invade Germany, not by proxy, or some other vital point in the world chess board.

Preventive war, provoked by the United States, is a hypothesis which must be discarded.

Russia remains. Must we assume that the Kremlin plans to cause a general war in the near future?

Certainly the reasons for which America shrinks with horror from the prospect of a general war, deliberately provoked, do not apply to Russia. The Politbureau is not hindered in its activities either by the ideals which determine the policy of the Christian and Democratic government or by concern over public opinion.

But there are other reasons which lead us to believe that Russia is not considering aggression which might provoke general war either.

We are here in the realm of pure hypothesis, verifiable only by future events. The facts are lacking but psychology and especially history are there. Regardless of the opinion of Paul Valéry, we do not have to be afraid of "entering the future backwards", for history and psychology are still in the last analysis the best guides for determining what our future will consist of.

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What then are the reasons which lead us to believe that Russia will recoil before general war? We shall enumerate a few of them:

1. Bolshevism is a civilian and not a military regime. Although Stalin gives himself the title of Generalissimo and sports a uniform, he is a politician, a civilian, that is also true of Voroshilov, Bulganin, and Beria and of all the other party chiefs, in spite of their shiny decorations and their resounding titles. They are civilians who are not interested in war per se. They ~~prefer to expand their power~~ prefer inexpensive laurels and the fruits of the victory for which they have not fought. That is what distinguishes them from Hitler and his band, who, although they were mostly civilians, were, like all good Germans, soldiers in spirit who loved war for itself.

2. The Bolsheviks are not militarists but revolutionaries, more fond of subversive activities than armed attack. And it must be admitted that up to the present time they have not been too unsuccessful. For stirring up trouble in neighboring countries, the Hitlerites had nothing but anti-semitism. That was something but it wasn't much. The social question the class struggle offers an extremely powerful lever to those who wish to upset the world.

3. Being hardened doctrinaires, the Moscow Communists believe that they are in possession of absolute truth in matters of philosophy and history. They still believe that the Democratic world cannot but fall as a result of its internal contradictions, provided they help it a little. They are still waiting for the inevitable American crisis which will overthrow this magnificent economic edifice, the fortress of Democracies. They wait and act everywhere at once, and not without success, for our old world is not above criticism.

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It is not by chance that their fire is especially directed against the Marshall Plan, for in order to overturn the Western regime it is necessary to provoke unemployment and promote distress. They have not succeeded in disgusting the West with American aid, but by forcing the European countries to rearm they are succeeding in retarding their recovery. In this regard they still have hope. That is one more reason for them to persevere in this policy rather than to embark on the great adventure.

3. It is because they do not care much for war in itself that the Bolsheviks have rarely attacked in the 33 years of their existence. The Baltic countries were not annexed until during the second world war. And Poland was not invaded until 17 September 1939, when it had already been overrun by the German army. It must be said Moscow does not like to attack forbs. If the Soviets decided to march against Finland, it was because they were sure that it would be a military parade. They almost made a serious mistake, and the immense USSR had to make a great effort to overcome little Finland. It is accordingly not very probable that Soviet Russia would deliberately rush into a frightening war against the Western coalition.

4. To wage war on a large scale it is necessary to mobilize, and the Bolsheviks do not like general mobilization. For a tyrannical regime that is a delicate operation. One cannot mobilize without giving weapons to peasants and workers and especially without giving generals more an important position in society. For a civilian dictatorship, Generals are as dangerous in victory as in defeat. After the second world war, Stalin succeeded in getting rid of his victorious generals. The chief

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of world Communism is too intelligent to fail to realize that miracles rarely repeat themselves.

Since the time of Trotsky, Bonapartism has been troubling the ^Urights of the Politbureau. A regime which has subjugated the army without being completely fused with it cannot escape all worry on this account. Even though all ordinary precautions are taken, having the soldiers watched by troops of police, and ^{the}officers by Party commissars, there are always grave risks in time of war especially in case of reverses.

5. The Russian army has always been excellent on the defensive and rarely ^{so} on the offensive. To fight with enthusiasm the Russian soldier must feel that his fatherland is in danger. He still does not feel that he is fighting for his home until the enemy has penetrated pretty far into territories which are really Russian.

The comparison of the Napoleonic invasion in 1812 and the Hitler war in 1941 shows many revealing characteristics. As long as the fighting was west of Smolensk the Russian soldier remains pretty cold. But when the imperial troops approached Moscow, the Russian soldier woke up. The battle of Moscow bore no resemblance to the operations which took place between Wilno and Smolensk. They fought to the death without reserve.

It was the same story in 1941. As long as it was in Poland and Lithuania, the Russian army defended itself feebly, and the soldiers surrendered by the hundreds of thousands. But as soon as the familiar name of Mzhaysk appeared in the daily communique, every thing changed. The same soldiers, who at the beginning of the war were surrendering not without a certain alacrity thought only of resisting. And surrender of large units stopped as if by magic.

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On the approaches to Moscow, with the help of the Hitlerite atrocities, the Russian soldiers realized that it was no longer a question of defending a hated government, but their wives and their children, their poor homes threatened by a fierce enemy literally drunk with blood.

The difference between Russia and Germany is striking. The Germans, who loved war for profit and pleasure, ~~xxx~~ only fight well on the offensive and on foreign territory which they wish to conquer. As soon as they are pushed back to their own frontiers they seem to lose their taste for combat. The question "For what purpose is this war", which they did not ask when they were approaching Paris they asked with insistence when they realized that the walls of Cologne. Hindenburg and Ludendorff, once they were sure of defeat, thought of nothing further but surrender. That is the reasoning of true soldiers. Why continue the fight if it is known that defeat is inevitable? Under the command of the generals, Germany in 1914 did not hesitate to take up arms. And their successors in the second world war would have done the same thing if it were not for Hitler's care and if the Allies had shown a little more flexibility in their relations with the German opposition.

In computing the possibilities of an aggressor war by the Soviet government, this profound difference between Russia and Germany should never be lost sight of.

If Stalin should ever lose his customary prudence and throw Russia into an aggressive war he would probably encounter a psychological resistance, a sort of passivity on the part of the soldiers, the consequences of which would be unpredictable.

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Propaganda, however powerful it may be, never affects the fundamental characteristics of the national character. An armed Russia involved against its will in a war of aggression might offer its rash chiefs some rude surprises provided that a stable and well-organized resistance was encountered.

6. There is yet another reason which leads us to believe that Moscow will stop short of general war. It is based on the present condition of the Soviet regime. However little we know Russia's internal situation, one thing alone is clear: the Soviet regime suffers from tension and even hypertension. As in the case of sclerosis, its arteries have hardened. Its functioning lacks flexibility.

In the Democracies the decadence of political institutions manifests itself in lack of discipline: people don't obey anymore. In the dictatorships, it is the reverse; people obey too much. In the long run that is even more dangerous, because in that way sense of responsibility and the spirit of initiative disappear in the administrative circles.

Under Lenin, the regime, dictatorial as far as the people were concerned, was nevertheless somewhat democratic in the upper echelons. The Trotskys, the Kamenevs, the Zinovevs, the Sverdlovs, the Dzerzhinskiys were collaborators of the chief; they were not his slaves. Lenin took the Central Committee quite seriously. He discusses matters with his colleagues and tried in cases of disagreement to convince them of his views, but he did not have the police ~~xxx~~intervene to wipe out all opposition inside the party. There was neither, in his time, the spectacular trial nor silent liquidation of inconvenient comrades. At this time, the top personnel of Soviet Russia were remarkable for their intelligence, talent, and spirit of initiative.

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The accession of Stalin changed all that. The main architects of the October revolution were disgraced at first and assassinated afterwards. The only men who escaped the successive massacres were those with pliant backbones, the bureaucrats ready with all sorts of retractions. Blind obedience became the supreme virtue and even a member of the Politbureau like Andreyev had to make public amends for a slight divergence in point of view in regard to agricultural policy.

In such a rigid regime, people who wished to survive, and every one does, even in the Communist Party, gave up every personal idea. From one echelon to another everybody obeys orders, and those, in the last analysis, can come only from Stalin himself in important matters.

It is often been asked if Stalin is still the actual head, or if he is only a name, a screen in back of which the Politbureau governs. A little reflection is sufficient to realize that in such a complete dictatorship orders can come only from one man and not from a committee. This collective body, the Politbureau, is composed of men who are after all subject to ambitions, passions, and the desire to reach the first place, where one disposes of the lives of others and where alone it is possible to safeguard one's own. If the real power was in the Politbureau, the functioning of this archdictatorship would be impossible. In order for this regime, monolithic on the surface and torn inside - for such is the law of every dictatorship - to function, dominance of one man is indispensable, and this man can only be Stalin. Now Stalin is 71 years old. Is it likely that a man of that age would decide, ~~xxxxxx~~ at the end of his life, deliberately to provoke the most horrible of wars?

But what about incidents, one might ask? What assurance have we that at a given moment one of these serious incidents neither wished nor anticipated by the men of power might not suddenly set off ^{the} ~~a sudden~~ explosion?

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That is certainly possible but it must be remembered that for years the international situation has been fraught with incidents any one of which would have been sufficient, in former times, to provoke a general war. We are living in a period in which real war does not break out because of an incident, but on the occasion of the incident, when the power that provokes it wishes war and provokes the incident only to make it break out. That has not yet happened, fortunately. If our analysis of the Russian situation is correct, we do not have to fear that an incident, even a serious one, might plunge the world into catastrophe, for America, despite all her firmness is always ready for conciliation, and Russia despite all her provocations, is always ready to fight and retreat, as soon as she sees that the free world is determined to meet the challenge.

7. When the balance of strength and weaknesses of Soviet Russia is computed, the satellites must be taken into account. On the map, they are very impressive. The Balkan countries with the exception of Yugoslavia and Turkey, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and finally, China constitute a considerable increment of strength and quite a bloc. However, there is a question: is the actual strength of this bloc or rather of this conglomeration in proportion to its extent? Could Soviet Russia, in the event of war, really count on her satellites? Are the Bulgarian, Hungarian, Polish, Czechoslovakian, and even East German armies so sufficiently sure so that the Soviet command could advance them against the combined forces of the West? Here again the past reveals to us the possibilities of the future. None of the satellite countries has entered voluntarily into the military and political system of Soviet Russia. They were all taken in by force. There can be no doubt as to the feelings of

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the large majority of the population in regard to the governments set up by the Russians in these conquered countries. In case of war, the satellites would pose some difficult problems for Russia. Surely, if the West is not defended these armies will march ahead like the Italian, Hungarian, and Rumanian troops during the Hitler war. But as soon as resistance solidifies, these auxiliary troops will fight badly or not at all. And the Russian army, like the German army before it, will be obliged not only to take all responsibility itself, but even to detach considerable forces to watch these "allies" who are so unreliable.

It is not enough to send a Soviet marshal to Warsaw to induce the Polish army to spill its blood in the service of Russia. And what is true in the case of the Poles is no less true in the case of the Czechs, the Hungarians, the Rumanians, and the Bulgarians. In case of war, large masses of soldiers, incorporated by force in a foreign, hated army, quickly becomes a dead weight and even an element of danger. It is easy in times of peace to exploit directly or indirectly countries which are occupied, but in time of war it is impossible to make them fight.

Nor in this regard either does there seem to be anything to encourage Soviet Russia to throw herself into the unpredictable venture of general war.

6. But more than all the reasons which we have mentioned, is the certainty of American intervention which reassures us as to the danger of immediate war. Neither the first or the second world wars would have broken out if the aggressor had not hoped to confine the conflict to European and even western proportions. In provoking the war with Russia and France Wilhelm II still believed in the possibility of English neutrality, and he did not even dream of the possibility of a conflict with

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America. If, in 1939, the United States had declared that they would fight rather than let France be overrun, Hitler himself would have shrunk from this unequal fight. The Führer had only cursory knowledge of the great world problems. Also he believed that America would never participate again in a European conflict. Moreover, the neutrality law in force in the United States did nothing to shake this conviction. But today the Atlantic Pact has replaced the Neutrality Law, and there is no longer the slightest doubt that in invading Western Germany Russia would come into conflict with the great American republic. No doubt, America has only a few divisions in Germany, and no one disputes the fact that Russia could easily displace, but in doing so Russia knows that she would provoke implacable war with the greatest actual and potential military power which has ever existed.

Soviet Russia respects American strength and it is easy to see why, for the fundamental Communist philosophy is worship of machines.

One of the fundamental points of their doctrine is that socialism can exist only in a highly industrialized country. It is for that very reason that the Mensheviks thought that the 1917 revolution should be confined to proclaiming the democratic and parliamentary republic, so that Russia by industrialization in complete freedom might prepare the conditions for a future socialist revolution. The Bolsheviks on the other hand believe that Russia could and should skip the "bourgeois" stage and pass directly from a still semi-feudal economy to a Communist economy. Industrialization instead of preceding would follow the revolution. In developing Russian industry at the feverish pace of the five-year plans, Stalin remained on the whole within the traditional party line. But precisely because they primarily saw industrialization in socialism, the Bolsheviks came to deify the machine. That is the origin of Lenin's famous equation: Communism

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is Soviet power plus electrification.

That is also the source of their respect for America, the country of modern technology. Traces of this feeling, held by the founders of the regime, are still discernable among the inheritors of the Movement. The criticisms which the Soviet press makes of Americans since the latter have become the advanced guard of the West, must not pry from us the true reality, the envy and admiration of the mechanical genius of the United States. The Russians know American strength; they know that Europe without American support would have given way long ago under their repeated blows. But no matter how they hate her they are afraid of her, and this is one of the main reasons for their caution.

In unleashing a general war, the Soviet chiefs know that they will have to fight the world's greatest industrial power. They also know that as soon as hostilities begin an atomic bombardment, much more destructive than Hiroshima and Nagasaki, await them in their most vital areas. The B-36's are not afraid of distance. From Asiatic, European, and African bases via the north pole these monstrous birds will come flying sowing death and destruction. When the B-36's have passed in what condition will their large cities be, and their industrial, administrative, and railroad centers? It is true, we lack precedence to estimate the importance of the destruction, but it is certain that it will be much more terrible than anything that has yet been seen. The best organized country would give way beneath this gigantic counter blow. This is all the more true of Russia, whose organization is maintained only by political system composed of orders and obedience. After a few days of atomic bombardment the transmission of orders may be ^{highly} ~~seriously~~ disorganized. What then will be the internal situation in Russia and will she be in a condition to prosecute a large war?

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But, it will be objected, Russia has the secret of the atomic bomb. She can also use this weapon. That is true but there is a large distinction between possession of the secret of manufacture and possession of a large stock of bombs, and especially possession of aviation qualified to carry the bombs across the Atlantic.

According to all that we know and imagine, Russia is still not in a condition to wage atomic war. If she were the war would have broken out long ago. And it is not the disapproval of the United Nations that has stopped it.

However one approaches the problem the conclusion is reached that general war is not eminent. While Russia is completing her atomic armament, and the state of her industry and her fissionable raw materials resources does not permit her to work as rapidly and effectively as America, the world is still protected from the great ~~explosive~~ catastrophe. For how long?

ARMED PEACE?

If agreement is impossible and war improbable, what remains except armed peace? Moreover, has it not been the "normal" state of Europe for centuries? That is no doubt true, but in our times this situation is much more serious and much more dangerously unstable. Armaments have never made more exhausting demands and never has this "peace" been more fragile. The word "peace" also sounds strange, during a period when hundreds of thousands of Chinese soldiers are fighting in Korea against United Nations troops without a declaration of war. How long can "peace", that is to say the absence of general war still be maintained?

It goes without saying that no precise answer can be given to this agonizing question but it can be affirmed with high probability that this precarious peace will last at least as long as it takes ~~the~~ Soviet

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atomic armament to reach an offensive level, which means not only the accumulation of a large bomb stock pile, but also construction of bombardment aviation adequate to carry them over the ocean.

This is not only a technological question of time of manufacture: It is also a scientific question depending on the present state and the possibilities of development of defense means, not against the bomb itself, for once the bomb ~~then~~ goes off there is no defense, but against the carriers. We are living in a period when inventions succeed each other so rapidly that the art of war is continually ~~affected~~ ^{af} fected.

This question cannot be discussed without including Vannevar Bush (Vannevar Bush, Modern arms and free men. Simon and Shuster, New York 1949) President, during the war, of the Office of Scientific Research and Development, an organization for the study and production of scientific weapons. Vannevar Bush is a man of unassailable competence; his ideas must always be kept in mind in discussing the probabilities of peace or of war.

Viewed over the centuries of its development, the art of war consists of a sort of course between the offensive and the defensive. Sometimes the one and sometimes the other predominates and this evolutionary rhythm is determined by technology, that is to say by science. The invention of any new weapon favors either the defensive or the offensive, however little it may be adopted and used to the full by the generals, which is not always the case.

The war of 1914 marked the triumph of the defensive. And then was seen after the initial surprise the spectacle of millions of soldiers immobilized in the mud of the trenches. The best prepared offensives bogged down after gaining a few kilometers. It was realized as Paul Valery said in an admirable discourse at the Academy, that "fire kills."

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The war in 1939 with its aviation and its mechanical divisions reversed the tendency, and the offensive again became paramount in battle. It is true that tanks and aviation already existed in the first world war but these revolutionary machines were still in their infancy, and the staffs did not attach the importance to them that they deserved. The disaster of 1939 and 1940 was necessary to make people realize what an offensive equipped with the new weapons could do.

But this triumph of the offensive itself only lasted for a while. Radar and other inventions, such as the proximity fuse, retarded the offensive impetus of the armies.

According to Vannevar Bush, this proximity fuse, used for the first time during Rundstedt's counter-offensive in December 1944, ^{multiplied} ~~multiplied~~ the effect of artillery. It was as though there were 10 batteries in a place where there was only one. This new machine caused consternation among the German troops, especially north of the breakthrough, and our author adds that this fuse probably saved Liège. "The proximity fuse may well have saved Liège". (Vannevar Bush: Modern Arms and Free Men pp. 30 and 31.)

The defensive ~~is~~ accordingly is now on the upswing. Is it so much so as to oblige us to revise the teachings learned in the second world war? And especially should we inquire what effect this progress of the defensive is likely to have on aerial operations?

Vannevar Bush thinks that a defense combination composed of radar on the ground, jet pursuit planes, the proximity fuse, and perhaps also some guided missiles would now be able to make the mission of bombardiers extremely dangerous and diminish their effectiveness. "But no fleets of bombers will proceed unmolested against any enemy that can bring properly equipped jet pursuit ships against them on numbers, aided by effective ground radar, and equipped with rockets or guided air to air missiles

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armed with proximity fuse." (Vannevar Bush: Modern Arms and Free Men, p. 53.) But no bomber squadron could attack with impunity an enemy that could oppose it in sufficient numbers with jet pursuit planes assisted by a good radar on the ground and provided with "rockets" or aerial guided missiles equipped with proximity fuses.

For that reason the author believes that aerial bombardment such as we knew it during the last war might become too costly in personnel and equipment. The situation is not entirely the same in the case of an atomic bombardment. ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ "The race between methods of bombardment and methods of defense is just beginning. At the present stage of the race it is not very doubtful that, because of the great speed of the bombardier flying at a very high altitude, bombs could be placed on the target with considerable accuracy." And further on, "In the long run, the defense certainly has a chance."

Like all experts, Vannevar Bush expresses himself with extreme caution, avoiding bald assertions. However, it seems to us that one can draw the following conclusions from his book: The defensive is certainly making great progress. ^{Against} ~~atomic~~ bombardment ~~concern~~ which in the terminology of the UNO might be called "conventional", defense is already sufficiently strong so that operations like those of the last war are becoming prohibitive. In the case of the atomic bomb, because of its enormous destructive power, the operation would still be possible and advantageous from a military point of view. For how long? A difficult question to which one can give no reply, because it depends entirely on the outcome of the race between the defensive and the offensive, which itself will be determined by the development of technology, that is to say, science.

If the defensive wins, the security of America will be assured, but the situation in Europe will become much more serious, because on the assumption of an equality of "scientific" armament, it is not very clear how America would be able to defend Europe. 18.

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The maintenance of peace then depends today much more on scientific research in laboratories than the number of large military units being formed, although large ground forces are ~~apparently~~ ^{obviously} quite indispensable.

The present situation, in which innumerable Soviet divisions face woefully inadequate allied effectives, is undoubtedly fraught with dangers. The only reason that war has not yet broken out is that the Moscow government knows well that the west, although poor in infantry, is nevertheless not entirely unarmed. American aviation, equipped with atomic bombs, watches over the security of western Europe. But though that guarantee has been effective up to now it will not remain so always, for it must be assumed that in the long run Soviet Russia will overhaul even America in the field of scientific weapons. The dislocation which would thus be created would certainly be fatal to peace.

The west then must rearm, not only in the air but also on the ground. Even Vannevar Bush, who is hardly an optimist, believes that a ground line, manned in depth and equipped with all that science has placed at men's disposal to massacre themselves, would have a chance of holding. On the other hand, General Halder, in an article in Figaro Littéraire, predicts that a Russian army thrown across the plains of central Europe would finally encounter grave difficulties from over-extension of its lines of communication (acknowledgment should be made to M. Pierre Grison, editor of Figaro, for having made available to the public this article by a great German technician, despite the difficulties which the Communists made for him in the past on a similar occasion).

Our time is limited, but analysis of the international situation allows one to believe that the final hour has not yet struck. Peace can still be maintained for the time being, not only because America has, for the time being, a great advantage over Russia from the atomic point of view, but also because the technology and industry of the

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United States is plainly superior to that of Soviet Russia. In the scientific race, America is nowhere near being beaten. That gives us evidently a few years of respite. For true partisans of peace that is an enormous advantage, for we must above all things gain time. Despite his propaganda apotheosis, Stalin is mortal like all of us. His regime is aging like he is, and when the chief disappears, the problems of succession would be so serious that the conflict would necessarily be long and drawn out. Modern warfare is a terrible shock. A system with arterial sclerosis, a prey to internal dissensions, can hardly incur that risk. Under such circumstances - but only under such circumstances - a large-scale negotiation undertaken without hate or bitterness would have a chance of success.

Upon reflection, the cause of peace is not ~~entirely~~ entirely hopeless.

Anatole Muhlstein.

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